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COSSAC Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan and the Genesis of Operation OVERLORD
Stephen C.
Kepher
Annapolis:
Naval Institute Press, 2020 Hardcover.
xviii + 300 pages. ISBN 978-1682475089. $40/£43.50
Reviewed by Robert T. Jones US Army Cyber School Fort Gordon, Georgia
First-time author
Stephen Kepher provides an inside look at the planning effort behind the 1944
invasion of Normandy in his book COSSAC : Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan
and the Genesis of Operation OVERLORD. This work spotlights the vital
contributions to the war effort by the joint Anglo-American planning staff led
by British General Frederick Morgan. From its bare beginnings, Kepher traces
the efforts of Morgan and his staff to secure the political and military
approval for what is arguably the single most significant military operation of
the Second World War. Appointed by a Combined Chiefs of Staff directive in the
spring of 1943, Morgan began his effort with an empty office, no staff, and no
commanding officer to head up the effort. In Morgan’s words, he had taken
possession of “a couple of desks and chairs. . . a few sheets of paper, and a
pencil that someone had dropped on the floor” [42]. The ad-hoc organization
even lacked a formal title, as one had not been specified in the original
directive. Drawing upon some self-inspiration, Morgan himself crafted the
somewhat grandiose acronym COSSAC – Chief of Staff, Supreme Allied Commander
[xi, 41]. In existence for only nine months, beginning in the spring of 1943
and concluding in January 1944, Morgan and his COSSAC planning team developed
the outline plan for the Normandy invasion. Working with very little planning
guidance and at times confusing lines of official authority, Morgan’s team
produced the plan that was ultimately executed with very little change in June
1944. By any standard it was a remarkable planning and administrative
achievement. Over the course of
twelve chapters the author traces the evolution of the COSSAC plan from the
Arcadia Conference (First Washington Conference, December 1941) to the arrival
in Britain of General Dwight Eisenhower as he assumed
the duties of Supreme Allied Commander (January 1944). Early in the book Kepher
provides a short history of amphibious operations and outlines the challenges
of coalition warfare as well as the often-conflicting strategic views of the
Western Allies. Front and center in this debate was the “Mediterranean first”
approach preferred by Churchill versus the direct cross-Channel assault
advocated by the Americans. Also included are summaries of strategic planning
conferences where decisions impacting COSSAC planning were made. Along the way
Kepher injects interesting anecdotes of Morgan overcoming challenges both large
and small. These ranged from simply organizing and staffing his team to
overcoming general bureaucratic inertia. The author notes that Morgan labored
without the benefit of historical precedent, as there was “no useful precedent
for a multinational planning staff that was also intended to be the foundation
of an operational headquarters” [45]. While not a biography, the author devotes
Chapter 5 to a biographical sketch of Frederick Morgan and his American deputy Major
General Ray Barker. The chapter provides useful insights into Morgan’s
unorthodox approach to planning and problem solving. In Chapter 9, Kepher
provides additional context by including the German perspective of their
problems in defending continental Europe against the long-anticipated invasion. A highlight of the
book is Chapter 6, which examines the four-day high-level planning conference in
late June 1943 where critical decisions were made. The conference dealt with a
myriad of thorny issues including locations, timing, air and naval support,
forces available, and the numbers and types of German defensive forces. Chief
among these decisions was the issue of where to invade, specifically between
the choices of Normandy and the Pas-de-Calais area. This decision involved much
discussion and at times heated debate. However, by the end of the conference
there was general agreement that Normandy was the better choice, and the
Pas-de-Calais was finally laid to rest [93]. Stephen Kepher has
produced a well written, thoroughly researched book on one of the lesser-known
aspects of the Normandy invasion. He draws upon a well selected list of primary
and secondary sources, including the diary and personal papers of General
Morgan. Also included are useful appendices for the British and American
command structures and the outline plan (abridged) for Operation Overlord. This
volume certainly adds to the scholarship of World War II in general and to the
Normandy invasion in particular. It will appeal to the general as well as
specialist reader.
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