Fred I. Greenstein,
ed.,
The George W.
Bush Presidency: An Early
Assessment (Baltimore & London:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003, $19.95,
xiii-314 pages, ISBN 0-8018-7846-2)—Michael Meyer,
Universität
Koblenz-Landau
After having perused dozens
of Bush-bashing books by liberal and leftist authors,
such as Sheldon Rampton’s & John Stauber’s analytic
Weapons of Mass
Deception: The Uses of Propaganda in Bush's War on
Iraq (2003), Joe Conason’s
polemical Big
Lies: The Right-Wing Propaganda Machine and How It
Distorts the Truth (2003), and Michael Moore’s
acerbic Stupid
White Men (2001), Fred I. Greenstein’s collection
of scholarly articles seems at first glance to beat
about the bush. All of the contributors seem to share
the ideas that Bush is an important president, that
the Iraq
war was successful, and that the United
States should take a lead in
world politics, ideas that have met with mixed responses
outside the US,
to say the least.
Some of the contributions “are
clinically neutral in their dissection of Bush’s performance,
but others advance distinct points of view, ranging
from near awe at the skill and will with which Bush
has advanced his purposes to deep concern about the
merit of those purposes” [x].
The first two contributions
and the last one deal with Bush’s character, leadership
style, and political ethos. The framing articles deal
with the President in a rather favourable light without,
however, ignoring his weaknesses. Conceding that Bush’s
early academic, economic, and political careers were
fraught with difficulties, Fred I. Greenstein claims
“that he was growing into the job” [9] after September
11 and displayed “his detailed mastery of what his
administration had come to call the war on terror”
[10]. The writer enumerates the controversial reactions
to Bush’s economic and international policies but
leaves their precise analysis and evaluation up to
posterity. He attributes a very limited notion of
“emotional intelligence” [13] as the control of passions,
“ample native intelligence” [14] without intellectual
curiosity, effective, “even eloquen[t]”
[15] public communication, organizational leadership
and policy vision to the President. Greenstein admits
in a subdued note that Bush was less “surefooted”
[16] abroad in his attempts at convincing the allies
of necessary military action against Iraq but could
have specified that Bush really antagonized a considerable
part of the national and international public, as
his critics’ widespread slogan “blood for oil” exemplifies.
In the final contribution to the volume, the first
director of the White House Office of Faith-Based
and Community Initiatives, the Democrat John J. Dilulio,
Jr., praises Bush as a compassionate
conservative and small—d democrat. Hugh Heclo gives a more balanced view of Bush, juxtaposing his
ethics of responsibility, tactical skill, “focused
agenda and decisive action” [45] with a lack of educational
leadership, which he considers to be essential in
the contemporary world of vast changes and complexity.
It is very disconcerting, however, to read that the
expert on history and politics repeatedly praises
Bush’s “triumph of the will” [45] without any apparent
awareness that the phrase is closely associated with
German fascism. The majority of the articles, which
deal less with Bush’s personality than his policy,
are bolder in outlook and broader in horizon.
Karen M. Hult
elucidates very well how Bush’s organization of the
White House closely connects policy and public relations
in the context of a very “volatile and uncertain global
environment” [75] and its continuous mass media coverage.
I would have liked her to expand the discussion of
Bush’s media policy, including the work of the White
House Coalition Information Center
and the Office of Global Communications, a task that
limitations of space might have prohibited.
Allen Schick convincingly explains
Bush’s paradoxical fiscal policy of cutting taxes
while raising debts by enormous expenses on “security”
as a calculated conservative strategy to pre-empt
the growth of government. Schick considers “the current
fiscal posture a colossal misstep” [80] because it
will take a long time to rebalance the budget. He
points out that Bush would need to address the problems
of social security and Medicare in the face of an
ageing baby boomer generation, which Bush has done
in his second term in office. However, Schick’s conclusion
that Bush is successful on tax reduction “but much
less so on spending policy” [99] dissevers the connection
between earnings and spending, which are but two sides
of a coin.
Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay convincingly argue that Bush’s
mission-driven strategy of pre-emptive war may have
convinced the American public, but fails both to meet
the challenges of complex globalization and to convince
international agents in order to coordinate an adequate
multilateral response to worldwide conflicts. However,
I fail to see why Bush’s alleged change from a rather
isolationist position to an aggressive hegemony in
foreign policy justifies the term “revolution” [100]
since, for example, the traditionally intrusive US
policy in their “backyard” in Central America does
not quite deserve the label of respectful multilateralism.
Charles O. Jones agrees with
John C. Fortier and Norman J. Ornstein on respecting
the President for his expert handling of the Congress.
In a legislative body with small margins, Bush managed
to control the agenda and to achieve many of his objectives
by a clever choice of partisan, bipartisan, or cross-partisan
strategies as necessary, complemented by capitalizing
on his position in office by issuing decisive executive
orders.
Gary C. Jacobson’s and Richard
A. Brody’s contributions on the electorate’s and the
public’s responses to Bush present overviews of the
changes in his support in the context of political
decisions and media coverage. After a brief “honeymoon”
at the beginning of Bush’s term in office, the president’s
public support soared tremendously after September
11 due to patriotism, but also Bush’s opinion leadership,
slowly trailed downwards due to corporate corruption,
spiked again during the campaigns in Afghanistan and
in Iraq, and gradually declined because of the public
discussion of the downsides of these military interventions.
While not delivering many new pieces of evidence to
the informed reader of quality papers, these two articles
give a precise and comprehensive picture that daily
reports cannot deliver.
In sum, the articles avoid the
extremes of conservative eulogies and liberal condemnations
of Bush. The texts are very informative and extremely
well written. They fulfil the high claim of excellent
scholarly research to “analytic clarity, rigorous
reasoning, sensitivity to complexity, and the ability
to place new developments in a historical context”
[x]. The volume is likely to expand and balance the
possibly more reductive and critical European perspective
on the President of the United
States of America.