James
C. Bennett, The
Anglosphere Challenge: Why
the English-Speaking Nations Will Lead the Way in the
Twenty-First Century (Lanham,
MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2004, $39.95, 337 pages, ISBN 0-7425-3332-8)—Trevor
Harris, Université François Rabelais, Tours
The Anglosphere—not formally
defined until half way through the second chapter—is
the emerging network of Anglophone societies whose fully
evolved civic dimension gives them a unified character
and distinguishes them from all other societies or groups
of societies. The Anglosphere
is characterised by its loose, unplanned, but highly
efficient structure, functioning through “coalitions
of the willing” or “variable geometry” [90]. It is a
“high-trust” culture in which individualism, enterprise,
the honouring of covenants and the rule of law are fundamental
attributes. Exchange throughout the sphere is facilitated
by the English language, as well as by the adherence
of the population to a powerful narrative which links
the different elements of the Anglosphere through its long history. The sphere is not racially
defined, however. It is the ultimate “template society,”
capable of endless assimilation: “For the purposes of
this work, a person of, say, Cantonese genetic ancestry
growing up in the United States is a member of American
society, of the English-speaking network civilization”
[147].
It is because of all these characteristics, according
to Bennett, that the Anglosphere
is best placed—as opposed to the Sinosphere
or the Hispanosphere, for
example—to take full advantage of the “Era of the Singularity”
[43]: that is, the point now reached in social evolution
where a number of paradigm shifts, occurring simultaneously,
combine to push the graph of human development into
a vertical climb. That Singularity brings with it “wonders
and dangers” and the Anglosphere—“the
cradle of the scientific-technological revolution” [6]—is
“the best hope of exploiting and constraining them”
[31]. The twenty-first century will, Bennett confidently
predicts, be the Anglosphere
century: it is “poised to lead us, step by step, through
the travails of yet more change, to the stars” [66].
In short, the English-speaking world is “the pathfinder
for all of humanity” [67].
Per
ardua ad astra…? I doubt whether Bennett has ever been in the RAF, but
he certainly enjoys a flight of fancy. Restraint, as
one can readily see, is not to the fore in his scheme
of things. Despite the denials dotted through the text,
the triumphalism of Bennett’s
position is difficult to dismiss.
Bennett himself describes the book as “a series of linked
essays” [7]. The links are there. Indeed, there are
rather too many of them. His argument—appropriately
enough given the centrality of information science to
the successful emergence of the Anglosphere—is
really a “loop.” At best, he often seems simply to be
affirming the obvious concerning the current domination
of American business practice and technology. At worst,
Bennett’s glib generalisations leave one rather dazed
at the theoretical insouciance of the whole enterprise.
The “Table of Contents,” in which each chapter is developed
in a long list of bullet points with no obvious hierarchy,
is already an indication of the assertive, iterative
style in which the entire book is couched. There are
no notes at all. Bennett does not arrive at any formal
conclusions. The “Annotated Bibliography” [291ff.] amounts
to little more than another restatement of the main
themes he has already worked through several times.
The text itself, as well as being repetitive and full
of generalisations, occasionally wanders into a quasi-aphoristic
mode and crumbles into a series of one-sentence paragraphs.
Bennett is no doubt a high flyer in many ways. But it
is sometimes difficult to avoid the suspicion that this
narrative, carried away by an almost boyish enthusiasm,
glides ever upward on the thermal of its author’s own
hot air.
He systematically rejects all aspects of the extra-liberal.
Geopolitical development, he asserts throughout, is,
and will increasingly be, conditional upon culture and
information, not on place. “Culture” and “place” are set in opposition and Bennett thus
turns “cultural studies” on its head: rather than seeing
culture as the starting point for a politics to “critique,”
as its proponents might say, the dominant discourse,
culture merely serves to enforce it. The Anglo-culture
in question, issued from the loins of Saxon England,
is a local, exceptional culture which, through what
is presented as its inherent superiority, has spawned
a global, self-aware, cultural
elite. Its central values are liberalism, continuity,
evolution. Feudalism, slaveism (sic), utopianism, the French Revolution, Marxism:
all these are so many foreign ideas sent to “plague”
(Bennett’s term) the Anglosphere, “an alien graft on its values” [106] and have,
one after the other, duly bowed to the slow progress
of the English exception, an unstoppable civic empire.
Indeed, the Anglosphere, Bennet
affirms, is “recognizably evolved from Alfred’s kingdom”
and the inhabitants of the Anglosphere
are the “heirs of the Magna Carta”
[89]. But the Anglo-world “does not impose solutions
on nations we cannot assume will benefit from them”
[91].
Bennett thus combines a quasi-mystical adherence to
the principle of continuity, while putting us in mind
of any number of “cultural” travellers from the nineteenth
century convinced that the benefits of liberal theology
were inaccessible to the non-white populations of the
British Empire. Just as British imperialists used evolutionary
science as an a posteriori
justification for their cause at the end of the nineteenth
century and the beginning of the twentieth, so Bennett
seems to appropriate technology for his purposes. Indeed,
for Bennett, as for those imperialists, history is one,
long, unfailing sweep towards the global dominance of
the English civic spirit. Bennett never bothers himself
with such trifles as “yob culture,” curfews, ASBOs, gun crime, myriad social injustices, endemic poverty,
“managerial” politics, cant or conniving media: and
that’s just in Britain. The putative
inhabitants of Bennett’s Angloworld
all seem, by default, to be footloose yuppies constantly
on the make.
Bennett concentrates on the twenty-first century and
has little time for the twentieth. The latter, in Bennett’s
reading, is no more than a vast and tragic parenthesis
for the world. True salvation for the future will lie
in the medieval English way, rediscovered by the nineteenth
century, which was in its turn rediscovered at the end
of the twentieth: Bennett is clearly imbued with the
same Victorianism as Margaret Thatcher—first on the
list of the author’s acknowledgements. Bennett even
recommends [92] the study of Winston Churchill as the
starting point for an “Anglosphere
studies program.” His neo-liberal faith jettisons declinist
discourse of both left and right varieties. He combines
obeisance to the pristine democracy of the English Shire,
with a boundless enthusiasm for the future of technocracy
and the e-world. Just as the expansion of England a
century ago prompted theorisation on the superiority
of the English race from a position of visible advantage,
so Bennett spins the present “Anglo-Saxon” hegemony
into a set of self-evident truths concerning the superiority
of the Anglosphere’s civic, commercial and—above all—digital arrangements.
Genes may have given way to “memes”—the digital building
blocks of hyper-evolution—and biology to information
science, the argument none the less remains rooted in
the concept of a superior society. The “imperial” has
mutated into the “Anglospherean,”
the physical has become the virtual. Yet the language
of domination has not been erased, but converted, re-encoded.
Bennett’s main historical model for the Anglosphere appears to be the medieval Hanseatic
League or, to a lesser extent, the modern Commonwealth.
True, he does find a counter-model within the limits
of the Anglosphere—multiculturalism—but
instinctively looks outside it for his main targets.
The EU—“more of a solution than the problem warrants”
[110]—in particular, and all things “continental European,”
of which he has monolithic, almost caricatural
vision, come in for repeated criticism. The EU, despite
some successes, remains “at its worst, a backward-looking
mechanism” [63], because of its subsidies and harmonisation.
Within the EU, France,
with its “low-trust society,” and centralised, “formulaic”
democracy, is the most complete and typical antithesis
of the Anglosphere. And poor
old England, “insulated from many of the more absolutist
influences” [35], was none the less “dragged into the
political system of the European continent” [93] by
the Norman Conquest.
Notwithstanding this temporary setback, democracy in
England remained
“substantive,” even if it was medieval, and despite
the fact that English society was feudal. Like so many
of his predecessors in this area—many nineteenth-century
utopians among them—Bennett believes that it is the
ancient constitution of England, hibernating through
the long winter of “continental” influence, which is
at the heart of Anglosphere
pre-eminence. It was this, Bennett argues, which typified
the outlook of those who took the Anglo-Saxon spirit
out of the British Isles: “The colonization of North
America happened in such a way that the most useful
characteristics of civil society were brought to its
soil from England, while many of the less useful remnants
of feudalism were left behind” [36]. Indeed, the degree
of belonging to the Anglosphere, moves outwards in a series of eccentric circles from its
English base: the inner core corresponds exactly to
old “white” Empire or “colonies of settlement.”
In short, Bennett is an “Evolutionist.” Evolution, that
is, not revolution, produces the most lasting results
for societies as for organisms. The “network commonwealths”—“the
characteristic political form of the emerging era” [67],
the Anglosphere foremost among
them—“will emerge in an evolutionary fashion, as do
most viable political mechanisms, growing from, altering
and redefining institutions” [148]. Social evolution
can only take place slowly and it is the very long history
of development of English civil society—already “well-rooted
by the fourteenth century” [34]—which gives it the edge
over its competitors in the struggle for domination
of the twenty-first century:
Social
mechanisms evolve, and evolution is conservative.
It rarely eliminates an existing evolved mechanism
unless it is actively harmful, and it prefers to work
by adapting existing mechanisms to new purposes. Thus,
a fish’s air bladder becomes an amphibian’s lung,
and a feudal parliament that evolved to resolve disputes
between nobles and kings becomes an instrument of
constitutional democracy. [109]
Taking his cue from Lamarck,
rather than Darwin or Spencer, Bennett argues that new
characteristics can be acquired within the space of
a generation and passed on to the next generation, thus
accelerating evolution further still. “Social Lamarckism,”
therefore, is what defines the progress of the Anglosphere:
the survival of the quickest.
In the end, for Bennett, technology has replaced art,
Western civilisation, as a consequence of “evolutionary
conservatism” [110], has effectively died out and been
replaced by “English-speaking civilisation.” The old
economic states can no longer keep up. The Anglosphere,
“more than coincidence but less than foreordained fate”
[10], the ultimate network commonwealth or civic union,
the “fast convoy” [161] will be governed through “a
sort of Hanseatic Diet in
Cyberspace” [168]. The EU, by contrast—from which Britain,
for its own benefit, ought really to withdraw—is an
economic union of economic states, still labouring under
“ponderous governmental bureaucracies” and “the illusion
of economic sovereignty” [2].
Bennett’s book is a vast case of special pleading in
favour of the laptop universe, the all-embracing, benevolent
despotism of the market. It would be difficult to imagine
a book more calculated to irritate or, more likely,
amuse French readers. This is Whig narrative raised
to the highest degree or, as Bennett himself might call
it, “Whig history 2.0” [4], a new updated version
of the civic society software which has already proved
its worth and is even now set to take the English-speaking
world forward once again to virtual pastures new.
|